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Introduction        
Terrorism today is a complex phenomenon.  Threats planned by al 
Qaeda, inspired by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), organized by 
revolutionaries, or conducted by lone wolves associated with a number of 
single-issue groups dominate the news.  By its nature, terrorism has ranged 
from attacks with knives, bombs, firearms, vehicles and the evolving 
technologies of the day.  In the past fifty years, aircraft and terrorism have 
been frequently linked. Understanding the threat of terrorism and the 
emerging targets of terrorism is a vital component of public sociology. 
  Since the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) hijacking of 
airliners in 1968 (Saenz 2016), aviation has been a focal point for domestic 
and international terrorism.  Initially, these acts were designed to free 
prisoners held by a host country or they were for ransom to fund further 
political goals and terrorism.  In some cases, such as the infamous D.B. 
Copper affair, it was purely for profit as a criminal act.  However, with the 
1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, direct attacks 
on aviation as surrogate targets for an enemy emerged. This escalation of 
aviation terrorism eventually resulted in the use of captured airliners as 
weapons of significant and symbolic destruction and the tragic events of 
September 11, 2001.   Thus, in just over 50 years, aviation became an 
increasing fertile and frequent environment for terrorism.  
The evolution of aviation terrorism has been marked by not only a 
greater loss of lives, but also significant economic and political 
consequences. In response to these threats, aircraft have been modified to 
strengthen cockpits and cockpit doors, rear loading stairways have been 
removed and anti-missile defenses have been incorporated in some high-
profile planes.  Cockpit personnel have been armed and undercover 
security personnel, specifically U.S. Air Marshalls, are now commonplace 
on many commercial carriers.  Operating policies and training have been 
adjusted, or in some cases, completely re-engineered to address potential 
threats. On the ground, airport security has been improved with greater 
perimeter security, worker, passenger and cargo/baggage screening.  In 
addition, new and more complex security protocols have been mandated by 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Transportation Security 
Agency (TSA), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and a number of 
international organizations, in response to increasingly sophisticated or 
innovative tactics or technologies employed by practitioners of terrorism.  
However, the reactive nature of counterterrorism in commercial aviation 
creates an ongoing dilemma between security and significant economic and 
social/legal costs to a society. 
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The terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001 were designed not only to inflict 
massive casualties and damage the targets selected, but also to 
symbolically challenge a nation and its sense of international superiority 
(Matusitz 2015).  In addition, this attack was designed to damage both 
global security and the U.S. economy (Price and Forrest 2009). Just as a 
result of this one event, the aviation industry experienced a direct loss of 
$330 million per day, not including the losses to related industries (Kumar 
et. al. 2003, 2). 
In response to terrorist threats to commercial aviation, numerous 
federal and international agencies and organizations seek to address the 
flaws and weaknesses within the field of aviation security. However, as the 
industry increases security and hardens the environment in response to 
terrorist threats, the asymmetrical nature of terrorism encourages its 
practitioners to seek alternative targets. As the pendulum of prevention has 
increased within the field of commercial aviation, the field of general aviation 
(GA) may become the next environment for terrorist activity. 
 
The Aviation Environment 
 
Since 1903, the U.S. has been at the forefront aviation. From the first 
manned, powered flight by the Wright brothers to the advanced flying 
weaponry of today, America has been fascinated with flight. This fascination 
has led to a rapid and continuous expansion of airports and airfields, as well 
as a national air system that is both flexible and surprisingly available to the 
general public. 
The U.S. supports the greatest number of airports in the world. 
Roughly half of the world’s airports and nearly two-thirds of the world’s 
busiest airports reside within U.S. borders.  There are over 19,000 landing 
areas in the U.S., spanning the range of grass landing strips, helipads, 
seaplane bases, and the more traditional paved runways (Wensveen 2016, 
139).  The overriding majority of these landing areas are privately owned.  
Of the 19,000+ landing areas, only about one-fourth are open for public use. 
Ownership of public use airfields generally falls into one of two categories: 
1) direct government ownership (municipal, county, or state), or 2) 
independent public authorities (whose members are often public officials or 
appointed by local governing bodies).   
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has established four 
general categories of airports in the National Plan of Integrated Airport 
Systems (NPIAS).  Commercial Service airports are public facilities which 
offer scheduled service (such as Delta Air Lines) and enplane nearly 2.2 
million passengers per day (FAA 2016).  There are approximately 500 such 
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airports in the United States.  Cargo Service airports provide air 
transportation of cargo only.  Airports may be both a commercial and cargo 
service airport.  Reliever airports are general aviation airports which are 
located in major metropolitan areas and have the capacity to off-load 
commercial flight in times of distress.  Finally, General Aviation airports 
neither receive commercial service nor meet the Reliever airport criteria.   
In addressing the threat of terrorism against public transportation, the 
United States has committed a majority of its resources to aviation (Fagin 
2006).  The Department of Homeland Security and the Transportation 
Safety Administration has, since 9/11, worked diligently to improve security 
or to “harden” commercial airports against terrorist threats.  Whereas al 
Qaeda has continued efforts to disrupt commercial air service world-wide, 
other groups, such as ISIS has directed or inspired its “soldiers” to attack 
the individuals or “softer” targets (Clemons 2010).  One such potential softer 
target within the field of aviation security is general aviation (GA). 
General aviation airports represent the second largest category of 
airports and operate on a daily basis throughout the United States. There 
are nearly 5,300 community airports in the U.S. which accommodate almost 
a quarter of a million aircraft representing 77% of all air traffic (Carafano 
2007, 1). Aside from the large metropolitan commercial airports, these 
municipal airports are easily recognizable to the local citizenry. While many 
have unique facilities and structures, nearly all have paved and lighted 
runways and taxiways, as well as some form of services provided to the 
aviators who use them. A typical general aviation airport contains at least 
one paved runway of around 5,000 ft. in length, a “terminal” building, fueling 
services (including fixed fuel tanks), lighting, communication radios, 
navigational aids, and less frequently, a control tower manned by FAA Air 
Traffic Controllers. On the whole, while GA airports are capable of receiving 
and launching a wide range of aircraft, GA airports are not considered 
terribly sophisticated operations (Bragdon 2008).  In addition, general 
aviation is a vibrant and expanding industry. It supports nearly 1.3 million 
jobs, which represents just over 1 percent of U.S.GDP (Carafano 2007, 1). 
 
Security Status at General Aviation Airports 
 
Since its inception, the Transportation Security Agency has provided 
significant and valuable direction to the nation’s large, commercial-use 
airports. The combination of perimeter barriers, security, and screening 
have become commonplace. While frequently considered a nuisance by 
passengers, these security measures are increasingly tolerated and have 
resulted in a higher level of security and safety at these large airports. The 
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same however, cannot be said about security at the remaining airfields 
around the nation.  In 2004, the TSA acknowledged that less attention had 
been paid to security at GA airports and with help of a GA working group, 
issued TSA Information Publication A-0002 “Security Guidelines for 
General Aviation Airport Operators and Users”.  
In many ways, the guidelines recommended in this document 
mirrored those at major airports by targeting access, perimeter fencing, fuel 
storage, signage, vehicle gate control, and lighting. Additional 
recommendations centered on pilot training at these airports, noting that the 
9/11 hijackings were perpetrated by pilots trained at small airport facilities.   
Of note however, is the lack of mandate for any of these guidelines. 
IP A-0002 clearly states that these guidelines are recommendations for 
improving security at GA airports and are not regulatory in nature (TSA 
2004, iii). The absence of mandates and regulations leave many experts 
uneasy (Goldberg 2011).  One of the principle concerns resulting from the 
events of September 11, 2011 was the use of aircraft as offensive weapons. 
The combination of size, range and fuel capacity of commercial airliners 
provided terrorists with a destructive force, capable of being delivered from 
within the U.S., to nearly anywhere in the host country and well beyond (e.g. 
the Gulfstream G-V, has a range of over 6,500 miles).  Today’s corporate 
jets, most of which operate from General Aviation airports, have similar 
characteristics as commercial airliners, but need much less runway length 
to takeoff or land, making them prime candidates for future attacks. Due to 
the lack of regulation revolving around GA security, these corporate jets are 
often readily accessible to the public. Incredibly one can frequently walk 
directly from their car in the parking lot, through the “terminal” and onto a 
corporate jet with little, to no, scrutiny.  With a limited number of the nearly 
19,000 GA airports being staffed by either TSA or Customs agents, the 
general-aviation industry is, for all intents and purposes, self-regulated.   
To better illustrate this condition, the Georgia Airports Association 
(GAA) recently conducted a survey of the ninety-one (91) airfields in the 
state of Georgia that have paved runways of 5,000 feet or longer.  A series 
of security-related questions were posed to the airport leadership teams, 
including the types and size of aircraft utilizing the field, the presence of 
perimeter fencing, the use of passenger screening techniques and the use 
of baggage screening processes.  Sixteen (n=16) of the 91 airports 
responded, for a response rate of nearly 18%.  The results of the survey 
support TSA’s concern over General Aviation airport security.  Ninety-four 
percent (94%) of the respondents indicated that mid-sized to large 
corporate jets operate at their particular airport, while less than half (44%) 
of those same airports instituted airfield perimeter fencing.  In addition, 
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those same airports reported that only 7% (1 out of sixteen) utilized 
passenger and/or baggage screening (GAA Survey 2016). 
 
Figure 1 – GAA Regional Airport Security Survey (2016) 
In its 2004 report to the House of Representatives subcommittee on 
Homeland Security, the General Accounting Office was critical of the current 
state of security at General Aviation airports.  The GAO report indicated that 
it believed increased federal oversight of security measures at GA airports 
was sorely needed.  Their findings at that time noted “TSA and other federal 
agencies have not conducted an overall systematic assessment of threats 
to, or vulnerabilities of, general aviation to determine how to better prepare 
against terrorist threats” (GAO 2004, 3).  Additionally, the GAO found that 
following the events of September 11, 2001, the TSA had “primarily focused 
on strengthening the security of commercial aviation and meeting 
associated congressional mandates” (GAO 2004, 24), leaving “general 
aviation managers and aircraft owners [to] determine what security 
measures they will use to protect their assets” (GAO 2004, 47).  Finally, the 
GAO noted that funding any security measures undertaken by GA airports 
has been significantly inconsistent.  In an audit of 31 general aviation 
airports, the GAO found that in one case an airport manager had spent less 
than $25 on security measures while another spent $3 million.  Nearly a 
third of the GA respondents reported that improvement funds came directly 
out of airport revenues, while only 20% indicated that they had access to 
federal grant money to pay for these improvements (GAO 2004, 47). 
While Information Publication A-0002 has remained the backbone of 
guidelines for security at GA airports, the TSA has recognized that 
operations, technology, and potential threats have evolved since 2004 and 
as a result, has proposed revising the current set of aviation regulations to 
enhance security at GA airports.  The proposed rule change impacts various 
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parts of 49 CFR and is known as the “Large Aircraft Security Plan (LASP)” 
proposal. This proposal was submitted for public comment via  the Federal 
Register in 2008 and would require aircraft weighing over 12,500 lbs. to 
undergo some of the same security checks that have up until now, been 
reserved for large commercial aircraft.  In addition, certain GA airports, 
specifically those designated as “Reliever” airports or those operating 
regularly scheduled service, would be required to meet several security 
requirements associated with large “Commercial Service” airports. The 
majority of the proposed security checks center on the aircraft itself; in 
particular, who has authorized access to the cockpit, cabin and cargo area. 
The regulation would also require operators to verify that passengers are 
not on the “No Fly” and/or “Selectee” portions of the federal government's 
consolidated terrorist watch list. Airport impact is much less, focusing 
attention on training for certain personnel and record-keeping. The TSA 
believes that these measures will minimize the vulnerability of aircraft being 
used as weapons.  
The negative reaction from a large portion of the GA industry to this 
NPRM was swift and loud, particularly from industry associations (National 
Business Aviation Association and General Aviation Manufacturing 
Association), as well as aircraft owners and flight crews.  The primary 
criticism of the proposed CFR changes involved cost v. benefit and 
government intrusion into private aviation practices.  To many industry 
followers, business aviation, a significant user of GA airports, is being hurt 
by the additional security recommended by TSA. Business aviation “is 
struggling to cope with new federal agencies indifferent to its needs while 
attempting to maintain operational commitments to serve customers 
efficiently” (Phillips 2002).  The National Business Aviation Association 
(NBAA) believes that voluntary action, including closer coordination 
between local airport managers, not government intervention, is the best 
course of action for GA airports when it comes to security measures (NBAA 
2008). 
The NBAA has taken a particularly strong stance against the NPRM 
proposal. The association has actively worked towards reducing the effect 
that the TSA policies have on general aviation (Wynbrandt 2011) and has 
been lobbying Congress for relief (Lowe 2013).  In response to the criticism 
of TSA autonomy and concern by the greater GA community, Congress 
passed House Bill H.R. 1204 “Aviation Security Stakeholder Participation 
Act of 2013”, which permanently established the Aviation Security Advisory 
Committee and formally structured a general aviation sub-committee.  The 
sub-committee has already provided the TSA with recommendations for 
revising the 2004 Security Guideline document as well as provided 
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recommendations for revising the NPRM. The recommendations included 
raising the definition of a “large aircraft” from 12,500 lbs. to 25,000-30,000 
lbs., reducing the impacted GA airports.  The TSA confirmed that the new 
SNPRM will focus its attention on aircraft and not small airports (Lowe 
2010).  
 
SWOT Analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats) 
 
A SWOT analysis of the current state of security at General Aviation 
airports indicates that a number of issues and actions related to potential 
terrorist threats require consideration. 
Strengths – The strength of the current state of security at GA airports 
emanates from the flexibility afforded by the TSA in IP A-0002 by only 
providing recommendations as opposed to regulations.  This allows each 
airport and its operators to customize their security measures to better meet 
their specific threats. In this case “one-size does not fit all”. Funds and effort 
can be used more effectively and efficiently using this approach.  
Weaknesses – The primary weaknesses of the current state stems from the 
lack of significant regulation and mandate.  Notwithstanding the benefits of 
flexibility and customization, reality often dictates that where there is no 
mandate (and little funding), organizations tend to “speak loader than they 
act”. In other words, while these airports and their operators may take 
security discussions seriously, when it comes time for execution, other 
directives often get higher priority. As a result, very few appear to be taking 
a strong position in favor of the TSA guidelines. 
Opportunities – The opportunities to improve the security situation are only 
limited by imagination and funding.  Since the advent of security measures, 
perpetrators have continued to be creative and “hit where the enemy isn’t”. 
If terrorists can think of new ways around current security measures, 
security experts can stay one step ahead provided they are thinking “outside 
the box. Again, funding rises to the forefront of this concern. Additionally, 
should the LASP or its derivative become law, it will add a level of security 
by mitigating the threat of terrorists using corporate jets as weapons 
(although certainly does not eliminate the possibility). 
Threats - According to the GAO, several threats are real and current. Others 
are lying in wait for the airports’ next moves. The principal threat emanates 
from intelligence gathering and intelligence sharing among airports and 
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agencies. While the use of larger aircraft as a weapon is somewhat 
mitigated by security protocols, the possibility still exists that they will once 
again be a target for terrorists.  Aircraft, regardless of size, can inflict 
significant damage if directed at appropriate targets.  And a new threat 
exists, from Unmanned Aircraft Systems (or drones), as they can be easily 
launched from GA airports.  It is now recognized that at most GA airports, 
there is currently little in the way of passenger or bag screening, virtually no 
limits to access of ramps or aircraft, limited perimeter fencing and - even 
more worrisome - very little funds available to alter this state (Price and 
Forrest 2013). 
The threat of the use of general aviation airplanes as a weapon is 
obvious.  However, there are a multitude of other potential threats 
associated with general aviation. As previously identified in conjunction with 
the 9/11 attacks, flight training of potential terrorists continues to exist even 
though Federal Regulations have increased the scrutiny of potential 
students (e-CFR 2008).  In the past, general aviation frequently has been 
associated with smuggling.  Potentially, the access and availability of 
general aviation may be an avenue for smuggling weapons, explosives or 
even terrorists (Price and Forrest 2013).  In addition, targeting general 
aviation also would have significant economic impact on the business 
community which relies heavily on it for timely travel and delivery of time-
sensitive materials.  Across the nation, employment resulting from general 
aviation totaled over 1.1 million jobs in 2013, and contributed nearly $219 
billion to the nation’s economy (PWC 2015). By making General Aviation 
airports potential targets for terrorist activities, broader and more expensive 
security measures would be required, threatening their economic viability 
while simultaneously producing the symbolic threat and presence of 
terrorists, spread throughout America. 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Historically, aviation terrorism focused on commercial aviation.  The 
visibility of previous attacks raised the level of social awareness and general 
concern.  The public is reminded of the threat every time the enter a major 
airport and proceed through a number of layers of security.  However, 
should a terrorist group decide to once again use aviation for their vehicle 
of terror, general aviation airports appear to be “soft targets” or prime 
candidates from which to launch their plans and impact the fabric of 
American society.  The relative lack of security at this category of airports 
affords creative minds a number of opportunities from which to exploit terror 
as both a direct and indirect threat.   
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A renewed focus on several areas of concern could aid in remedying 
a significant portion of the current threat risk.  Among the first and potentially 
most impactful solutions is to dictate and enforce perimeter fencing and gate 
control.  As an added measure of security, GA airports or FBO operators 
should be required to designate a ramp security “officer” and provide that 
officer with passenger “screening” processes such as questioning anyone 
on the airport grounds as to their purpose.  All employees and staff 
members with access to the airport grounds should be badged and badges 
should be visible at all times. Controlling access is not difficult or even 
moderately expensive, but practice at commercial airports has shown that 
it is effective. 
Always an issue, funding for these programs could come directly 
from FAA grant funding.  Each GA airport is entitled to a certain share of 
funding annually (around $150,000). Should the FAA make these steps 
mandatory, each airport could use these funds to offset costs, and should 
that be insufficient, the FAA could augment funding by channeling funds 
designated for less important uses. Of course, that would require the FAA 
to give some level of priority to this concern. 
In the past decade, academe has recognized the potential terrorist 
threat that exists with regard to the general aviation community.  A number 
of institutions have developed training programs in GA airport security.  For 
example, Waukesha County Technical College include the following topics 
in their security-related training programs: 
 
• How to recognize GA aircraft and facilities that could be used for 
illegal purposes; 
• How to apply crime prevention through environmental design 
concepts to GA airports; 
• Establishing an Airport Watch Program; 
• Establishing aircraft key control system; 
• Antitheft devices for GA aircraft; 
• Security signage and marking plans; 
• How to orient local law enforcement personnel to airport 
environment and aircraft operations; 
• Creation of an airport security committee; 
• Creation of an emergency notification system; 
• National Incident Management System fundamentals; 
• How to create a business continuity plan;  
• Developing instruction detection, integrated security and CCTV 
systems; 
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• Troubleshooting airport security plans. (Price and Forrest 2013). 
 
Aviation security is a risky venture. Since the early days of flying, it 
has enjoyed a mass appeal, which makes aviation a great venue for terror. 
Following the events of 9/11, the country took exceptional steps to reduce 
the security risks at commercial use airports.  With that avenue limited, 
terrorists will almost certainly seek another route.  To be sure that it doesn’t 
begin at General Aviation airports, it is imperative that any threats 
associated with this category of airport be given priority, and subsequently 
minimized.  
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